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Dale Jamieson

University of Colorado at Boulder

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WILD/CAPTIVE AND OTHER SUSPECT DUALISMS

Dale Jamieson
Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado, Boulder

INTRODUCTION

Dualisms have had a hard time in recent years. Philosophers used to think that facts and values were distinct, and that philosophy and science were radically different enterprises. While scientists employed empirical methods to discover the way the world happens to be, the job of philosophers was to use conceptual analysis to reveal how the world necessarily is. In the wake of the revolution unleashed by Quine in the early 1950s, philosophers either had to learn some science, find another job, or fight an irredentist action on behalf of conceptual analysis that is mainly of interest only to a few other philosophers (see the essays reprinted in Quine 1961; for discussion see Burge 1992).

The loss of these comfortable dualisms has upset the complacency of scientists as well as philosophers. Ethics cannot be ignored when the NIH requires ethics modules as part of all new training grants, when human and animal research must be approved by university committees, and when both the general public and "opinion leaders" feel free to comment on a wide range of issues that a generation ago might have been regarded as purely scientific.

DUALISMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The attack on these dualisms had also made itself felt on various political and social movements, including the environmental movement. Classical environmentalism (CE), the dominant view of the American environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, seemed to suppose that there was an all or nothing distinction between clean and polluted air, that wilderness is wild nature untrammelled by humans, and that wild animals are those who live lives that are completely independent of humans. For the CEs the distinction between the natural and the human was fundamental. Beaver dams are natural but Glen Canyon is not. Nature is stable and self-regulating: change, lack of balance, and

disequilibrium are the effects of human intrusion. The ultimate goals of the environmental movement is to protect nature from human beings, and human beings from themselves.

In recent years the New Environmentalists (NEs), many of whom are scientists or economists, have denigrated CE as a naive or outmoded view. With that special wrath that siblings and sectarian Marxists reserve for their next of kin, some NEs seem to see CEs as the enemy of the environment. By holding out for confused and unrealistic goals, CEs spurn the opportunities to make a difference that are available. They demand what they cannot have and, despite their good intentions, nature is crushed between the CEs on one side and the "wise use" movement on the other.

At least three influences that have contributed to the rise of the NE:

One influence is the generalized cultural effects of Post-Modernism (PM). For better or worse PM has become the reigning intellectual perspective of our time and its influence is felt in a variety of different ways. Our current tendency to see change as constant, difference as dramatic, and categories as slipping, sliding, colliding and melting into each other is an expression of PM; so is our suspicious of ideals and our tendency to see logic and rhetoric as continuous or even the same thing. In some circles arguments and armies are evaluated on the same basis: how effective they are in changing people's behavior. PM hovers in the background of all contemporary cultural work and conditions the responses even of those who claim to have no idea of what it is (for further discussion see Jamieson 1991).

A second influence that has contributed to NE is the rise of environmental history and the new ecology. It has become common to say that the kind of wilderness envisioned by the CEs hardly ever existed anywhere at any time in which there have been human inhabitants. Stories are told about how the ecologies that we now associate with wilderness were created by aboriginal populations acting on the land in Australia, North America, and Great Britain. Not only do CEs have a false conception of wilderness, but on this view they also have an ethnocentric one (see Callicott and Guha, both reprinted in Gruen and Jamieson 1994). Their conception of wilderness could only arise in a highly developed society that is out of touch with its origins and misunderstands the way that billions of people continue to relate to their

environments. While environmental history shows us the ubiquity of human interaction with the land, the new ecology emphasizes the tumultuous and even catastrophic natural history of the Earth. The greatest extinction episodes in the history of life preceded the evolution of humans. Nature, independent of humans, is often out of balance and equilibrium.

A third influence is the tendency to see environmental risks as inevitably increasing. The problem for environmentalists is not to reduce risk, for that appears to be out of the question, but to manage and distribute risk in an acceptable way. The air will be polluted - the question is how polluted, in what respects, where, and who will suffer the costs. Most nonhuman life will take even more of a beating in the next century than it has in this century. Since we can't prevent these negative environmental changes, the challenge is how to manage them so that they will be less unacceptable than otherwise would be the case.

WILD AND CAPTIVE

One distinction that the NEs are tempted to collapse is that between wild and captive animals. The distinction is often overdrawn in the first place and will become even more blurred in the future. It has been argued that cheetahs who live in the wild passed through an evolutionary tunnel that probably had nothing to do with people. This reduced their genetic diversity to such an extent that, from the point of view of population genetics, they are similar in many respects to populations of captive animals. In the future, NEs argue, the distinction between wild and captive animals will collapse even further as parks and preserves increasingly come to resemble zoos and zoos increasingly come to resemble parks and preserves.

What will drive this pressure towards the further blurring of wild and captive animals are concerns about species survival. For many species, either bringing them into zoos or managing populations in their natural habitats are the only hopes for their survival. The very idea that these animals could be left alone with some "hands-off" management policy is regarded as a dangerous delusion. People are involved in changing global land-use patterns, destroying ozone and perhaps even changing climate. Almost no form of life is unaffected by human action (see McKibben 1989). Animals living under these new global conditions are not wild in the CE sense of the term, despite the "born-

free” mythology that is reinforced by television nature shows. Moreover management of captive animals is getting better all the time. Sometimes it is even argued that intensive management practices can preserve more of the “wild” traits of some populations than less aggressive policies. On this view freedom and captivity are no longer mutually exclusive.

THE DESCRIPTIVE AND THE NORMATIVE

The NE critique of various dualisms in environmental philosophy is not just an intellectual exercise. Various specific policy prescriptions are supposed to follow from this critique: for example, that we should aim for optimal (rather than zero) pollution; wilderness should be intensely managed; wildlife must “pay its own way.” Once we see that pressure on wild populations will only increase, that extinction is the only practical alternative to intensive management and captive breeding, and that the difference between wild and captive animals is overstated anyway, then we should give up our opposition to zoos and our sentimental attachments to individuals animals and embrace high-tech, intensive management schemes directed towards preserving species. Zoos should be turned loose to bring in more animals from the wild. Captive breeding should be accelerated even if this means “euthanizing” zoos animals who are not part of such programs.

But slow down. While this story is attractive to many people its conclusions require further argument. CE need not give up their substantive views simply because some old distinctions have been called into question. Even if it is true that we are in an age in which distinctions are disappearing, nothing much normative immediately follows from this. Maybe the NEs are right, and wild and captive animals aren’t different from each other as many of us might think. If so, we’ve learned something. But further argument is needed to show that we should act in some way or another.

DUALISMS AGAIN

It might be objected that I have reintroduced one of the dualisms that NEs would reject — the distinction between the descriptive and the normative. It is worth asking how thoroughgoing the NE critique of dualism is. In deed, some might argue that rather than rejecting dual-

isms NEs have assimilated one side of various distinctions to the other. Rather than rejecting the very distinction between wild and captive animals it could be argued that NEs want to treat all animals as captive animals. But even if that is an excessively harsh charge, the distinction between the descriptive and the normative is worth hanging on to. Excepting perhaps certain forms of supervenient naturalism, all moral theories hold that reasonable people can agree about the facts yet disagree about the values (for discussion of supervenient naturalism see Brink 1989).

However the main point I want to make is that if the NE case against dualisms is successful it should lead us to understand the distinction that the CEs make in a different way, but it should not lead us to reject these distinctions altogether. In the light of the NE critique we should view such dualisms as expressing pragmatic distinctions, perhaps useful for certain purposes but not for others, matters of degree rather than metaphysical differences of kind, in most cases with important human perceptual dimensions. No case had been made for supposing that such distinctions are unintelligible, pointless, or useless. It would be just as rash and unmotivated to give up these distinctions in the face of the NE critique as it would be to conclude that there is no distinction between the bald and the hirsute on the ground that even the bald have a little hair and even the hirsute have some bald spots (however small).

We can see how the CE dualisms can be reconstructed by considering the case of wilderness. For the sake of argument suppose that the CEs define wilderness as natural areas that are radically distinct from humans and the effects of their actions. Now let's suppose, as NEs have argued, that there are no such areas — that sometime during human history all areas have been affected by human action, that even now climate change, ozone depletion, and jet contrails are everywhere. What should we conclude from this critique?

What we should not conclude is that wilderness does not exist, and therefore we should abolish the Wilderness Act and disband the wilderness system. What we should conclude instead is that the distinction between wilderness and nonwilderness is a matter of degree. That a particular way of drawing the distinction between wilderness and nonwilderness fails does not show that there is no point in drawing such a distinction or that we fail to pick out something that is

important to use when we talk about wilderness.

Consider a case in point. In reflecting on his childhood, John Ruskin remarks that the pure childish love of nature ... in myself ... has always been quite exclusively confined to wild, that is to say, wholly natural places, and especially to scenery animated by streams, or by the sea. The sense of the freedom, spontaneous unpolluted power of nature was essential in it (Ruskin 1991:22).

Suppose that an NE points out to Ruskin that what he thought had been a "wholly natural place" had been inhabited Neolithic hunters. Does this mean that Ruskin had failed to refer when using these words, or that his experience of the "pure childish love of nature" was in some sense ungrounded, to be extinguished insofar as he is fully rational? Of course not. All that is important (holding some other factors fixed) for securing reference or grounding the experience is being able to draw a significant distinction between what is natural and what is not. This distinction need not reflect an essential difference in kind that is part of the fabric of the world. What is important for Ruskin and for us is that there is a distinction in experience or conception.

What does this mean for the distinction between the wild and captive? Even if this distinction is a matter of degree rather than kind, it can still be significant. Even if it is a human distinction that is conventional to some extent it may still properly play an important role in our moral thinking. Whatever moral force this distinction may have is not blunted by the NE critique.

THE RETURN OF THE NORMATIVE

What I have been suggesting is that the NE critique may teach us something about distinctions and how they work, but that it has no immediate implication about what our policies should be. Questions such as whether we should try to preserve areas of the Earth that are as free of human influence as possible, and if so what priority these attempts should have, nor not answered by pointing out that there are no parts of the Earth that are entirely free of the consequences of human action. Nor does it follow from the fact (if it is one) that the distinction between wild and captive animals is a fuzzy pragmatic one that we are justified in depriving some animals of freedom in order to

preserve their genetic material. Although the NE critique of CE may lead us to understand these questions in a somewhat different way, there is little reason to think that we should change our answers to them.

The winding road leads back to the moral considerations involved keeping animals in captivity. Elsewhere I have discussed these considerations in detail (in Gruen and Jamieson 1994, and in press). What I have argued is that there is a moral presumption against keeping animals in captivity, and although zoos do provide benefits in the areas of entertainment, research, education and preservation, they are not significant enough to overcome this presumption. Moreover I have argued that the idea that by keeping animals in captivity zoos can preserve wild nature is a cruel hoax. If we continue to keep animals in captivity, we should conform to the highest standards of treatment and respect; there should be no question of killing some animals in order to make room for others who would also be unjustly confined. This is the least that morality demands. These conclusions, contrary to what some may think, do not turn on any particular analysis of wild and captive. For those who want to reject these conclusions there is no substitute for doing the hard work of confronting the moral arguments that I have given.

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JAMIESON - DISCUSSION

Norton: There is much that I agree with in Jamieson's presentation, in particular the notion that there is a moral presumption in favor of keeping wild animals wild. This idea puts a premium on the type of moral soul-searching that will be necessary to justify invasive procedures. There is a great deal of disagreement about how successful captive breeding and reintroduction programs have been and will be in the future. Success, or lack of it, affects the strength and kind of moral justification necessary. The problem is clearly set: Is there a moral justification? It is not productive to relate the idea of the welfare of the species, to the concept of rights of species. The traditional conception of rights is so closely linked to individuality in the history of philosophy that the attempt to extend that concept to apply to species does not work.

It seems to me that intergenerational human obligation is really the heart of the matter and cannot be passed over or treated as unimportant. When I hear people talking about sustainability I do not see any reason to interpret sustainability as having anything to do with rights of species. That was simply an aberration in the history of environmental ethics which unfortunately has not been fully corrected. I look at these things quite anthropocentrically, but that does not mean that I have no concern about pain and discomfort and invasive changes in the lives of individual animals. I see that as a separable question from what is our bequest, and it seems that the bequest of this generation to the next should include some kind of healthy, functioning ecological system and processes, as close as possible to a full complement of species that exists and have existed. It is necessary for us to provide moral justification for these activities, especially when they include pain or disorientation of animals. I agree with the moral presumption of wildness. Protecting the wildness of wild animals is also part of that bequest. If we pass on a totally domesticated landscape the future will be worse off in many ways, including ways that affect values. Having some kind of realistic connection to an independent, functioning, self-organizing ecological world is an essential part of human psychic and moral development.

What we need to do is get away from this notion of human interests versus animal interests, when in actuality it is human interest against

human interest. We are a generation that is in the process of creating a holocaust in the biological world. To stand by and do nothing is totally morally unacceptable. This brings us back to the point that there is significant disagreement around this table about a factual matter; does this work? Can we accomplish it? There is evidence on both sides, but I am a strong believer in adaptive management, comprised mainly of two strategies. First, set some goals and choose modest efforts that will move one towards those goals. The second strategy is to design programs in such a way that the amount of information and knowledge one gets is maximized.

So the real conflict is between generations of humans. The moral principles are principles of sustainability and obligation to future generations. Those are strong enough to overcome the obligation to keep every wild animal wild in every situation. Which of our efforts are likely to work, and which will increase our knowledge base so that future efforts are more likely to work? If we fulfill the above two conditions in the choices that we make we will have made an adequate answer to Jamieson's challenge to provide a moral justification.

Kaufmann: I noticed the idea of "new environmentalists" versus "classic environmentalists." What occurred to me is that while I might be able to find two or three authors that would fall into either category, does that create a movement? Even if there is a movement, what does that mean? Do all new environmentalists think or believe certain things? More importantly, do they all act on their beliefs?

Jamieson: First I think it should be assumed that everyone here wants to preserve nature and all of its wildness. I do not, however, see this as just a conflict between human interests. It is the welfare and well-being of individual animals that gets lost in the shuffle. I do not see this as just a factual question about what works and does not work because I think there are a lot of questions about what the "it" is that we want to work or not work. In some sense it is such a difficult speculative issue about the future that it almost becomes minorly empirical.

In terms of Hutchins' comments, these issues are deeply theoretical and philosophical. We are going out and taking action, but reflection on that action is necessary. We cannot be heads without bodies or thoughts without actions. Finally, in terms of these movements I do

think there is a new wave of thought and a new wave of thinking about environmental policy. The “old” idea is that these animals have the right to share the earth with us.

Hutchins: Although I think I agree with the moral presumption against captivity intellectually, I want to make clear that I do not think this is an animal well-being issue. It goes deeper than that. I could argue just as strongly that conditions are bad for individual animals in the wild and that there is a moral presumption not to leave them there. I think that there is a potential alternative argument there because animals in the wild are subject to disease or poaching or parasites, etc. If these conditions in the wild are really bad, I could argue that animals ought to be brought into captivity purely from a humane point of view.

There is a logical hole in your argument that because captive breeding may not have been a perfect strategy in certain cases in the past that it will not be in the future, given that programs and knowledge change. I agree that this strategy should not be sold as a panacea; it is not something that will have widespread success by itself and we ought to carefully select species for which we decide to pursue this strategy. However, there are going to be species for which this will be required. There also are many alternative uses of living collections that go well beyond captive breeding for reintroduction. These include public education, raising of money for conservation, the media attention, political action, etc. We are moving in the direction of alternative uses of living collections and to provide individual justification for those species that we manage.

Genetic and demographic management is a welfare issue as well as a conservation issue. If you are going to have captive populations and justify their use and utilize them in some beneficial way for conservation then you should manage them responsibly. That means genetic and demographic management. Without such management there is an individual cost to animals that are produced in inbred populations that could cause suffering if they are not properly managed.

Clifton: In Quebec the whole legal structure of the society proceeds from the belief that the rights of the many supersede the rights of the individual. Overseas the rights of the individual are basically nonexistent. The collective entity is what reigns supreme. We have to deal with this reality every time we go overseas to try to save a species and

at the same time we have to deal with the other reality of different social structures which largely ignore the individual. I am suggesting that any philosophical discussion had better take into consideration the political reality of the situation we are dealing with, as well as our own moral conceptions. If we go into Africa or Asia and start preaching our gospel, we had better be preaching in a language they are going to accept.

Grandy: I do not think you can talk about species welfare unless you talk about the units that make up the species in terms of individuals. We talk about captive populations in this country, but I do not see how you can separate the population from the individual welfare of the animals that make up the group. If you want to go worldwide, you are talking about a few more animals but I do not think you can lose sight of the fact that each of those individuals is in fact a valuable unit within that species. It is only when we start to look at situations we are reading as black and white and we determine that some animals have a surplus population that those individuals no longer have value.

Rowan: How would you deal with the issue of whether or not to interfere with a coyote that has been hit by a car on the side of the road at Yellowstone.

Grandy: That is different. I am talking about the coyote that is fighting another in an area that has been interfered with by humans.

Rowan: What you have then is a sliding scale. The more we intervene the more responsibility we have toward the animals.

Grandy: Yes, the more we intervene the more responsibility we have. The extreme is where we have animals in zoos. We have to intervene incredibly in a situation like that. I do not know that captive breeding is going to or has worked.

Rowan: Once again, you are not disputing the fact that breeding has taken place and that populations in captivity are increasing. The issue is, what is the larger goal?

Grandy: Populations are increasing, and in some cases they are declining. But no one is addressing the issue of what we are going to do with these things. Hopefully we can get into that and talk about the

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Grandy: Populations are increasing, and in some cases they are declining. But no one is addressing the issue of what we are going to do with these things. Hopefully we can get into that and talk about the

nuts and bolts of the issue.

Hutchins: I have to take issue with that. Essentially that is why the AZA has set up a system, for strategic collection planning. We are identifying what is out there, what we think we ought to have, and the justification for having these particular animals. Is it public education? Is it captive breeding and reintroduction? Is it scientific research?

There are some pretty horrible things that happen in nature. For example, African hunting dogs tear an animal apart while it is still alive. It is a terrible thing to watch from our point of view, and from the individual animal's point of view it is not a good thing. I am saying there are some real ethical paradoxes there. Is the issue human intervention and the degree of human intervention, or what the effect of a particular situation is on a particular individual animal?

Rowan: That is basically what I was pressing Grandy on. The more you become involved in intervening with the animal, the more responsibility you are going to have. You can ignore these problems if you are not actually involved. From the point of view of the animal it does not make a difference who disembowels you.

Pacelle: Regarding Hutchins' point of suffering as the principle criterion in motivating us to concern, I think that there is more to the rights of wildlife question than purely the humane and suffering issue. I think that the general community has not seen that philosophy well developed because it has relied principally on a couple of major texts. Peter Singer's work Animal Liberation dealt with the industrial uses of animals principally, and included chapters about factory farming and the use of animals in laboratories. He entirely sidestepped the question of wildlife. Tom Regan's philosophy does not include wildlife as part of his central analysis. Wildness, autonomy of the individual animal are things that need to be put into the mix as well.

Lewis: I wanted to return to an earlier point of Jamieson's. I agree quite strongly that problems for animals are caused by human population or other kinds of human impact and that human society in general has stronger desires than merely protecting wildlife or ecosystems. Even with all of the nature television shows, and most people we know get the majority of their information from television, I do not see that translating in any real way into political support for preserving

animals. I really do not see it as a national movement of any kind. In my experience with politicians, having lobbied both in congress and spent a lot of time in state legislature in Massachusetts, they give lip service to such issues but do not vote to give one the kind of support that one desires. I think this is a real critical issue for all of us for unless there are more pillar people who are willing to support these kinds of conscious efforts we are doomed to failure.

Bostock: The use of the term "euthanasia" should be reserved for what it should mean: killing an animal in its own best interest. The paper does recognize that. This in not to say whether culling is necessary or not necessary, it is a question of the word used. The term "surgery" is used similarly with some as a euphemism for vivisection.

In regards to the well-being question, I absolutely agree with Norton that the term "rights" does not make much sense applied to a species. We talk about the health of individuals, but we are also concerned with the health of communities. We are involved especially with the well-being of individuals, in as much as individuals are conscious and are going to have feelings. In that sense it is only individuals that can enjoy well-being. We can talk about the well-being of a community or species but these two obviously clash. When the population gets too large, it suffers. This applies to humans as well. Clearly a wildebeest that has just been torn to pieces by hunting dogs is not in a state of well-being. We do know that the population of wildebeests would be in a bad way if there were not hunting dogs to control their numbers. The two together are in some sort of balance, presumably a state of well-being, so that is well-being of different populations or species in relation to one another.

Jamieson: Clearly it would be madness to suppose that we do not talk about community health and population suffering and the average American and other purely fictional entities. When you say that the death of this wildebeest is to the benefit of the population, that is just a shortcut way of saying that this individual wildebeest is suffering but that there are other benefits that will improve the quality of life for other wildebeests. The fact that we use language in that way does not mean anything more than the fact that the average American has 1.8 children, as if there is such a thing as 1.8 children.

Cohn: The welfare of the species is, I think, shorthand for the collec-

tive welfare of other individuals. It may also revert to the welfare of a process for assistance that may be perhaps separate from the welfare from a group of individuals. I am not certain that they are separate, but I can see welfare of the species referring either to a process or to individuals. I am not sure, for other reasons, that I see species welfare or rights as being overly relevant. In fact I would almost push this aside and agree with Norton that what is relevant is the welfare of future generations of humans. The question that again comes up is where do we intervene? Where do we have responsibility? It may also revert to the welfare of a process for assistance that may be separate from the welfare from a group of individuals. I am not certain that they are separate, but I can see welfare of the species referring either to a process or to individuals. Each of those things say to me that what the animals perceives is not what people feel is relevant. It is what is happening to us that people feel is relevant. If that is really the case, if that is the moral perspective that we are following, that suggests that the only things with rights are humans and future generations of humans.

Norton: I think we have to draw some distinctions here. What I meant to say was that I certainly think there is a descriptive concept of an individual number of species doing well or doing badly. I also believe that there is probably a broader sense, which is the collective doing well, somewhat independent of the individual. It was not my point that no one is looking out for the welfare of the species. My point was a moral one. I do not know that anyone feels a moral obligation to the welfare of a species, independent of how it affects any individual. It could be a useful descriptive concept which we would then in turn use to say that if a species is doing badly then we are in danger of morally harming future human individuals by reducing their possibility of experience. My point was not that you cannot keep track of how species are doing. It would be only an approximate moral judgment, that the moral force behind that would derive from an intergenerational ethic, not from any moral obligation to this moral composite. I think it is a mistake to say that there are people out there who are saying that the species has a right, and that the right of the species should be balanced against the right of individuals. There are people who are concerned about the well-being of species, but that is probably better interpreted as an intergenerational moral foundation.

Jamieson: I think part of what is at issue in this debate is our very

strong tendency to be individualists with regards to humans, and collectivists in relation to animals. I would like some standard for what makes a healthy population, but I would like to go back to what I think welfare is really about. The reason we care about human welfare is that human lives can go better or worse and we care about what happens to “me,” as do a lot of individual animals. Whatever moral framework we want to apply to humans, and I think the individualist one is the most plausible, should be applied to animals as well.

Hutchins: There is an inherent conceptual problem here and it has to do with the interrelationships that occur in ecological systems. If we are going to focus on individuals we need to think really hard about the impact of the individual on other aspects of the system and on other individuals. If, for example, we fail to cull elephants and they create a desert out of what was once a woodland, lots of other individual animals are going to suffer in the process. Perhaps we need to weigh the collective costs and benefits of that, the inaction versus the action. I do not know how one would go about doing that because it is very complex. Conceptually you can think about it and keep it within an individual framework even though you are talking about a system.

Jamieson: I agree. But yet for the same reason we wind up on different sides. I think that ecological concerns can be translated individually. The real issue is not that the environment is going to hell because animals are eating each other, but that enormous misery is being created because of human impact on the environment. If we are going to be moral individualists it is human behavior and its impact that we really need to think about and control.

Robinson: Your assumption is that species’ welfare in some sense is an aggregate of individual well-being in that population. Take an action that is obviously not good for a specific individual. If such an action produced a 15% increment for all the other individuals and the population as a whole benefitted, then that would be morally justifiable. Is that what you said?

Jamieson: That question is deceptively simple, and I don’t want to get into the complexities of how you would know that or measure that. Broadly, whether we are talking about human or non-human there can be cases where the sacrifices of individuals may be justified, and the justification is in terms of its impact on other creatures.

Robinson: So maybe the discussion is not so much about moral quality, but on the perception of the efficacy of certain actions.

Jamieson: That is part of it, but there is still a lot of mystification in our thinking that centers around the fact that we are individualists about human reflectives, about animals, and that if we would really think about animals in an individual way a lot of our policies would look different.

Hutchins: You could argue just the opposite from a collective point of view, and if we were in another culture we might. I think that the focus on individualism stems from the fact that we are in an individualistic society.

Bekoff: I think there is a theme to all these discussions, and that theme is the notion of wildness. The most recent statement was Hutchins' discussion of elephants. Elephants make a desert of something and other species die. I could say, "Big deal, that is what elephants do in the natural world." But that immediately gets me back to this notion of interference. It puts me, as a field biologist, in an incredible dilemma. Some of you study coyotes, and I have seen a coyote kill far more mice than I would like to think about. I have studied penguins and watched predators kill penguin chicks and eat penguin eggs. We should observe and learn about what is natural, what is wild. If we do not study what it is, how in the world can we learn what wild animals do?

The notion of intervention in sickness is an interesting one. To what diseases do wild animals succumb? How and do they recover? How are diseases transmitted among wild animals? If a coyote gets sick and I go out and do something for him, I cannot learn about any of these aspects of sickness. There is nothing cool about watching a coyote kill a mouse, and there is no doubt that the mouse is suffering. But if I interfere, how can I learn about the natural or wild world? Things happen in the world that we do not like. We do not ascribe moral agency to coyotes, we do not say the coyote is bad for killing the mouse. There are things going on in the world that we just should not interfere with. There is a sense of wildness that is beautiful, that we should respect and admire. It is too bad that deer get killed by wolves. I would perhaps like the world to be different, but it is not.

Hutchins: I agree. I had the same feeling when I was watching a geographic special on lions and hyenas. There were some incredible scenes of the horrors of nature. A female lion selects a spot for her den, the spot turns out to be a cobra's den and the snake bites and kills the cubs. It then bites the mother lion, she walks off salivating and is almost killed by hyenas. As a human being, I can feel sympathy and empathy for that animal, but I know that as a conservationist this is precisely what I am trying to preserve. That is called living with paradox, and in many cases that is what we are having to do. We are trying to take all of these ideas, according to what kinds of moral precepts we operate on, and categorize them. I think that is something we need to give some thought to.

Clifton: I want to bring the discussion back to the issue of culling. There is a study that Rowan did a few years back in which he studied the cultures of Humane Societies and discovered institutional *modus operandi* there was centered around euthanasia. This in turn created a lot of inertia as far as finding solutions to the feral populations. If you were to draw a diagram of this you would have a problem. You have to have a certain number of animals to have a viable population in captivity, but some animals outlive their usefulness in one way or another thereby creating a surplus. If you institutionalize the idea of "options" and the easiest option from a cost point of view is culling, what you are ultimately doing is institutionalizing culling. When you institutionalize something that is difficult and may be morally repugnant to some people you are institutionalizing with it a defense mechanism, the idea that culling, like euthanasia, is a sacrament.

Rowan: I think the problem of the issue of culling and euthanasia is in the use of the terms. It is, in fact, sacrifice, and that is not discussed. It becomes an established part of the process. It creates great distress and concern and we tend to ignore that it is the system.