Citation

Author Website

http://luishfavela.com/

Commentary Type

Invited Commentary

Thread

Michael L. Woodruff, Consciousness in teleosts: There is something it feels like to be a fish

Abstract

Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.

Author Biography

Luis H. Favela is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences at the University of Central Florida. His interdisciplinary research at the intersection of philosophy and the mind sciences applies complexity science and dynamical systems theory to investigations of behavior, cognition, and consciousness in diverse systems at various scales. http://luishfavela.com/

DOI

10.51291/2377-7478.1243