Morsella, Ezequiel and Walker, Erica B. (2016) What makes us conscious is not what makes us human. Animal Sentience 9(11)
Colin Klein and Andrew B. Barron, Insects have the capacity for subjective experience
Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.
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