Mallatt, Jon and Feinberg, Todd E. (2016) Insect consciousness: Fine-tuning the hypothesis. Animal Sentience 9(10)
Colin Klein and Andrew B. Barron, Insects have the capacity for subjective experience
Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.
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