Down through the past decade and more, no philosophical writer has taken a greater interest in the issues of how we ought to act in relation to animals, nor pressed more strongly the case for according them rights, than has Tom Regan, in many articles, reviews, and exchanges at scholarly conferences and in print. It is a pleasure to join him on this symposium, to explore this interesting and important set of issues.
I shall begin by outlining, as fairly as I can, Regan's view of the matter, and then sketch my alternative. Regan has in fact criticized certain aspects of my position at some length in his book. My replies to those criticisms will be largely implicit here, and I will not dwell on them when outlining his view.
Narveson, J. (1986). A case against animal rights. In M.W. Fox & L.D. Mickley (Eds.), Advances in animal welfare science 1986/87 (pp. 191-204). Washington, DC: The Humane Society of the United States.