Steward, Helen (2016) Animals aren’t persons, but is it time for a neologism?. Animal Sentience. 10(19)
Mark Rowlands, Are animals persons?
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals have a property he calls “pre-reflective awareness,” (ii) the capacity for pre-reflective awareness is sufficient to satisfy the traditional Lockean definition of personhood, and (iii) satisfaction of the traditional Lockean definition of personhood is sufficient for being a person. I agree with (i) and can see that there is a persuasive case for (ii), but I think the case against (iii) blocks the conclusion that animals are persons. I suggest that we may need instead to coin a neologism in order to express Rowlands’s insight; the concept of person is insufficiently malleable to do the job.